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Abstract
This paper sheds new light on the “trade costs” of sovereign default. It
argues that the decline in trade in the wake of sovereign debt crises doc-
umented in earlier studies is the result of a reduction in exporters’ access
to foreign credit. Using an annual panel of 28 industries in 100 coun-
tries between 1980 and 2007, it shows that default leads to a stronger
contraction in the exports of sectors which are more dependent on ex-
ternal financing, consistent with this hypothesis. This finding is robust
across different econometric specifications, and of economically signi-
ficant magnitude. It suggests that any impact of sovereign default on
trade, rather than a cost of default in its own right, may be a symptom
of reduced access to international capital markets.
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1 Introduction
This paper sheds new light on the nature of the supposed “trade costs” of
sovereign default. I employ a large panel of developed and developing coun-
tries to analyse the impact of default episodes on countries’ sectoral export
behaviour. The key finding is that default leads to a stronger reduction in
the exports of sectors which are more dependent on external financing. I ar-
gue that this empirical pattern is consistent with a decline in credit supply
to domestic exporters. My estimates suggest that most of the adverse im-
pact of sovereign default on trade found in earlier studies is explained by this
credit channel. They contradict the widespread notion that reduced access to
international goods markets constitutes a cost of sovereign default. Instead,
shifting trading patterns may be a symptom of reduced access to international
capital markets.
Figure 1 plots the time-series pattern of a measure of the financial de-
pendence of exports for six countries which experienced at least one sovereign
default episode between 1980 and 2007.1 Vertical lines indicate the timing
of these episodes. Sovereign defaults tend to coincide with, or to be followed
by, declines in the average financial dependence of exports, indicating a shift
in the composition of exports away from highly financially dependent and to-
wards less financially vulnerable goods. The main contribution of this paper
to establish the generality of this observation econometrically, and to highlight
that it may be understood as a result of a temporary comparative disadvantage
inflicted upon exporters by a reduction in capital-market access.
The view that the economic costs of sovereign default manifest themselves
partly in the pattern of trade flows has a long tradition in the literature on
sovereign borrowing. For example, in their seminal paper about sovereign
lending in the presence of strategic default Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) justify
the assumption that defaulters incur a direct output cost by appealing to
“retaliatory interference by the creditors or their governments with commodity
trade”. Similarly, Bulow and Rogoff (1989) argue that foreign lenders’ ability
to interfere with debtor’s trade flows poses a credible threat, claiming that
fear of “trade sanctions can plausibly explain the actual repayments that do
occur”.
These examples reflect a wider, as yet unanswered, question about the
incentives for sovereign debtors to honour their obligations towards foreign
1Following Do and Levchenko (2007), I calculate country c’s average financial dependence
of exports in year t as
∑
i FinDepiExpcit/
∑
iExpcit where Expcit are sector-i exports by
country c in year t, and FinDepi is a measure of the financial dependence of production in
sector i. Data sources and definitions are discussed in greater detail in Section 5.
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Figure 1: Default and the Average Financial Dependence of Exports, Selected Countries
creditors. By definition, loan contracts with sovereign entities suffer from lim-
ited legal enforceability. Yet for decades large volumes of such international
loans have been extended, and subsequently repaid. Much research has been
dedicated to uncovering the economic penalties for default which may sustain
these cross-border financial transactions, and “trade costs” are one among sev-
eral explanations which have been put forward. The threat of exclusion from
international capital markets is a prominent alternative explanation. While
there is extensive evidence that countries which default on their international
debt obligations experience reduced access to international capital markets,2
the impact of sovereign default on the debtor economy’s trade with the rest of
the world has only recently started to receive formal empirical attention.
Rose (2005) is the first to document that debt renegotiations are followed
by a significant and sustained decline in trade between the debtor country
and its foreign creditor nations. Applying a gravity regression to an unbal-
anced panel of over 150 countries in the period 1948-1997, he finds a significant
7% annual decline in exports and imports between countries involved in debt
renegotiation, lasting for 15 years. Although he remains agnostic about the
precise explanation for this observation, Rose interprets his findings as con-
sistent with deliberate trade sanctions by creditor nations designed to punish
2See Gelos et al. (2003), Arteta and Hale (2008), Fuentes and Saravia (2010) and Men-
doza and Yue (2008) for recent examples.
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obstinate debtors. Subsequent work by Martinez and Sandleris (2008) casts
doubts on this interpretation: using the same methodology and data, they
cannot reject the hypothesis of an equal decline in the debtor country’s trade
with all its trading partners, whether sovereign creditors or not. They also
note the absence of a single known instance in which sovereign default was
punished with overt trade sanctions in the last 30 years.3
Since Rose (2005) uses aggregate trade data and fails to pinpoint a clear
causal link between default and the decline in trade, his findings are open to
the criticism of reverse causality and omitted variable bias. For this reason,
Borensztein and Panizza (2010) take a different approach to identifying the
“trade costs” of default. The authors use a panel of 28 industries in 24 countries
for the period 1980-2000 and show that sovereign default causes a larger decline
in the value-added growth of export-oriented sectors. Since their study exploits
the differential impact of default at the sector level it is less likely to suffer
from reverse causality and omitted variable bias, providing further evidence
that debt crises “hurt” exporters. However, just as its precursors, it does not
explain why this might be the case.
This paper is closely related to Borensztein and Panizza (2010). Like them,
I employ a difference-in-difference approach in the spirit of Rajan and Zingales
(1998) to study the impact of sovereign default at the sector level.4 Unlike
them, I test directly for a particular causal link between sovereign default and
trading patters − namely that default reduces exporters’ access to external fin-
ancing. My identification strategy, which is firmly grounded in modern trade
theory, predicts a differential impact of default on the volume of exports. This
allows me to ascertain how much of the decline in trade flows attributed to
default in earlier studies can be explained as a result of the credit-channel
emphasised here. The present empirical analysis also benefits from a signi-
ficantly larger sample, covering 28 industries and 100 countries between 1980
and 2007.
My regressions show that default episodes result in the strongest decline
in the exports of those sectors which are most dependent on external finan-
cing. This finding is robust to additional controls for other financial crises and
3By contrast, Mitchener and Weidenmier (2005) document that between 1870 and 1914,
disgruntled creditors did resort to gunboat diplomacy to punish instances of sovereign de-
fault, and that such “supersanctions” triggered a decline in trade.
4Following their seminal paper on financial development and growth, the Rajan-Zingales
methodology has been adopted by a number of authors for empirical studies in a variety
of contexts. Among others, it has been used to examine the effect of financial development
on growth and output volatility (Fisman and Love, 2003; Braun, 2003; Raddatz, 2006),
the impact of financial liberalisation on exports and growth (Manova, 2008; Levchenko,
Rancière and Thoenig, 2009) and the consequence of banking crises for value added and
exports (Kroszner, Laeven and Klingebiel, 2006; Iacovone and Zavacka, 2009).
4
alternative industry characteristics, and independent of the precise sample
composition and the lag structure of the econometric model. It lends strong
support to the hypothesis that shocks to foreign credit supply can explain the
“trade costs” of sovereign default. Based on my estimates, this credit channel
accounts for most of the overall impact of sovereign default on trade.
From the vantage point of the empirical literature on financial development
and trade, this paper’s findings mirror the study by Manova (2008). Her work
examines the impact of financial liberalisation on trade, and finds that it boosts
the exports of the most financially vulnerable sectors. Treating default as
“inverse” financial liberalisation, I find that it leads to the largest contraction
in the exports of the sectors which are most dependent on external financing.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 motivates
my identification strategy with a simple model of international lending and
trade in a small, open and capital-scarce economy. Section 3 describes the
data and presents the empirical results. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
In the following, I develop a standard model of intra-industry goods trade
between countries. I assume that capital is perfectly mobile internationally
and introduce the effect of sovereign default as a “black-box” increase in inter-
national financial frictions which raises the cost of borrowing in the defaulting
economy. The model serves to highlight the key identifying assumptions un-
derlying the regression equations estimated in Section 3.
2.1 Assumptions and Derivations
2.1.1 Demand
Let the world consist of C countries, c ∈ {1, ..., C}, and let there be I indus-
tries, i ∈ {1, ...I}. Industry I produces a perfectly tradable homogenous good,
using labour only, which can be assembled in any country with identical unit
labour productivity. However, in all other industries i ∈ {1, ...I − 1} coun-
tries have access to a specific technology for manufacturing a unique, perfectly
tradable variety c. As a result C × (I − 1) + 1 goods will be produced and
traded in equilibrium.
Suppose perfectly competitive producers in each c assemble a non-traded
final good in industry i ∈ {1, ...I − 1} from the set of tradable, country-
specific varieties using a production technology described by the minimum-cost
5
function
Bit (Qcit) =
(
C∑
c′=1
p1−εc′it
) 1
1−ε
Qcit, (1)
where pc′it denotes the price at time t of the perfectly tradable product variety
produced by country c′ in industry i, Qcit is the desired final-good output
of industry i in country c and ε > 1 represents the elasticity of substitution
between varieties. Final-good output in each industry, therefore, is a CES
aggregate of the C country-specific varieties. It is now straightforward to
show that total nominal demand for goods produced by country c in industry
i is equal to
pcitqˆcit =
(
pcit
Pit
)1−ε C∑
c=1
Ecit, (2)
where Pit ≡
(∑
c′ p
1−ε
c′it
) 1
1−ε and Ecit is nominal spending by country c in in-
dustry i at time t. Demand for each variety c in industry i is thus directly
proportional to total world spending on industry-i goods, and inversely pro-
portional to its share in a measure of the industry price level, Pit.
2.1.2 Supply
The unique, country-specific technology for producing variety c in industry i
is described by the minimum-cost function
bcit(qcit) =
1
Act
(
Rct
αi
)αi ( Wct
1− αi
)1−αi
qcit, (3)
where qcit is the output of good c in industry i, Act is a measure of country c’s
total factor productivity, and Rct and Wct are, respectively, the cost of capital
and the wage rate in c at time t. The parameter αi ∈ (0, 1) is a measure of
industry i’s capital intensity.
Capital is perfectly mobile across industries and borders. Meanwhile, la-
bour is perfectly mobile across industries within countries, but not across bor-
ders. Normalising the price of the homogenous, perfectly tradable industry-I
good to 1 nevertheless ensures that Wct = 1 ∀ c.
Let product and factor markets be perfectly competitive. Then,
pˆcit =
Rαict
Actα
αi
i (1− αi)1−αi
, (4)
kˆcit =
αipˆcitqˆcit
Rct
, (5)
where kˆcit denotes the demand for capital at time t by industry i in country c.
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2.1.3 A Small, Capital-Scarce Economy
Suppose the ability of country c to rent capital in international markets is
impaired by the presence of a borrowing friction. Specifically, letting Kct
equal c’s domestic stock of capital,
Rct =
Rt if
∑
i kˆcit (Rct) ≤ Kct
Rt
1−pict if
∑
i kˆcit (Rct) > Kct
, (6)
where Rt is the international rental rate and pict represents the generic fric-
tion. One way to interpret pict is as the (perceived) risk that due payments
on capital loans from foreigners at t will be expropriated by c’s government
and redistributed among the residents of country c, or diverted towards other
projects. Risk neutral lenders will raise the interest rate on capital loans in
anticipation of such expropriation.
If
∑
i kˆcit (Rct) ≤ Kct, the borrowing friction does not affect c’s producers.
I will make the assumption that c is capital-scarce, i.e.∑
i
kˆcit (Rct) > Kct. (7)
Clearly, if pict = 0, country c can borrow at the world rental rate while if
pict > 0, the cost of capital in c is higher than in world markets. My empirical
analysis in Section 3 tests the hypothesis that sovereign default raises pict
without providing a microfoundation for this assertion. Nevertheless, it would
be possible to provide a number of theoretical justifications from the recent
literature.5
So far, I have not specified how the economy’s existing stock of capital, Kct,
is distributed among its residents. Suppose each industry’s share of the eco-
nomy’s capital endowment is uncorrelated with the industry’s capital intensity.
Then industries with a high capital intensity will tend to be more dependent
on external finance than industries with a low capital intensity, and we may
take αi as a measure of the industry’s financial dependence.
Define Xcit as the value of c’s exports in industry i at time t and let
Eit ≡
∑
cEcit. Using equations (1) to (7),
5For example, Sandleris (2008) shows that debt repayment may be used optimally by
governments to signal private information about their future stance towards foreign credit-
ors. In his model, default signals a hostile future environment for foreign creditors, and thus
reduces foreign investment. Similar informational assumptions can also be used to motivate
a rise in pict following sovereign default.
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Xcit =
[
(1− pict)αi Actααii (1− αi)1−αi Pit
Rαit
]ε−1
(Eit − Ecit) . (8)
I assume that c is small, so that changes in c do not affect Rt, Pit, Eit and
Eit − Ecit ≈ Eit.
2.2 Empirical Implications
Under the assumption that country c is small, it is possible to re-write equation
(8) approximately as follows:
lnXcit ≈ − (ε− 1)αipict + ∆it + ∆ct, (9)
where ∆it ≡ (ε− 1) ln[ααii (1− αi)1−αi PitE
1
ε−1
it /R
αi
t ] and ∆ct ≡ (ε− 1) lnAct.
According to equation (9), we should expect two effects of a rise in pict due to
default: first, a decline in country c’s total exports and, second, a reduction in
the exports of sector i which is larger the more financially dependent i (i.e. the
larger αi).6 In other words, we should observe default as a country-industry-
time-specific shock.
The next section outlines the paper’s empirical strategy which aims to de-
termine whether the effect of sovereign default on sectoral exports is consistent
with a model along the lines of the above.
3 Data and Empirical Results
3.1 Empirical Methodology and Data
3.1.1 Empirical Methodology
The main empirical objective of this paper is to establish whether the impact of
sovereign default on sectoral export patterns is consistent with the hypothesis
that default reduces exporters’ access to credit. As illustrated in the previous
section, this would require us to observe that sovereign default reduces sectoral
exports in accordance with their financial dependence. In order to establish
whether this is the case, I employ a difference-in-difference approach in the
6Note that the model generates a one-for-one relationship between an industry’s capital
intensity and its financial dependence by assumption, but this is not a necessary condition
for the Rajan-Zingales methdology to be applicable. Their approach − a variant of which
will be employed in Section 3 − only requires that i) interest-rate shocks have a bigger effect
on the production cost of more financially dependent sectors and ii) financial dependence is
a technological feature of each industry that is fixed in the short run. The model outlined
in this section provides one example of a setting in which these conditions are met.
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spirit of Rajan and Zingales (1998) extended to an annual panel for the period
1980-2007.
Ideally, one would like to estimate the regression
lnExpcit = β0 +
N∑
n=0
β1nFinDepi ×Defaultct−n +
N∑
n=0
β2nDefaultct−n
+β3FinDepi + γZcit + εcit, (10)
where lnExpcit is the log of country c’s exports in sector i and year t, FinDepi
is a measure of sector i’s financial dependence, Defaultct−n is a dummy taking
value 1 if country c defaulted in t− n and 0 otherwise, and Zcit is a vector of
control variables. However, as sovereign debt crises tend to occur in economic-
ally tumultuous times any such specification would be open to the criticism of
omitted variable bias in the set of key coefficients {β1n, β2n}n. For this reason
my baseline regression equation takes the form
lnExpcit = β0 +
N∑
n=0
β1nFinDepi×Defaultct−n + δct + δit + γZcit + εcit, (11)
where δct and δit are, respectively, two sets of country-time and industry-time
dummies.
The advantage of the specification in equation (11) is that the impact on
exports of any time-specific country or industry shocks (such as a decline in do-
mestic GDP, or a fall in world demand for sector-i output) should be controlled
for by the large array of fixed effects − insofar as their sectoral impact is not
systematically correlated with the industry’s financial dependence. As such, it
allows for {β1n}n to be estimated consistently by exploiting cross-sectional and
time-series variation in the occurrence of default among the sample countries,
and the cross-industry variation in financial dependence. However, it does not
permit me to identify {β2n}n.
Irrespective of this shortcoming equation (11) can be used to test the hy-
pothesis that sovereign default leads to a temporary rise in exporters’ cost of
obtaining credit, thereby reducing the exports of highly financially dependent
industries relative to those which are less financially vulnerable. If it is correct,
we should observe β1n < 0 for n = 0, ..., N . Yet, without knowing {β2n}n, this
finding is in principle consistent with sovereign default reducing or increasing
exports overall. For the most part I will focus on the differential impact of
default across exporting sectors, but Section 3.3.2 provides two alternative es-
timates of the overall impact of default on manufacturing exports, discusses
their plausibility and compares them to the findings of earlier papers.
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A practical difficulty in estimating equation (11) concerns the appropriate
number of lags, N , to incorporate in the estimation. It seems reasonable to
suppose that any default-induced rise in the economy’s cost of foreign borrow-
ing may persist for months or years after the event. In the baseline estimation,
I arbitrarily restrict my regression equation to two lags of the default dummy
to capture such persistence. However, in Section 3.2.2 I analyse the robustness
of my results to the incorporation of additional lags of default.
3.1.2 Data
Data on the value of countries’ sector-level exports between 1980 and 2007 is
taken from UN Comtrade, via the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS).
WITS reports trade flows annually in current U.S. dollars and coded at the
three-digit level of ISIC. I check the data for errors, inconsistencies and changes
in definitions and convert it into constant 2000 U.S. dollars, using the U.S.
GDP deflator.
Since import flows tend to be more accurately and consistently reported
across countries, I base my export series on mirrored import data reported by
each country’s trading partners. To ensure sufficiently long time series, and
sufficient within-country variation, I drop all country years for which fewer
than fifteen sectoral export flows can be obtained, all sectoral export series
with fewer than fifteen annual observations, and all countries with fewer than
fifteen sectoral export series that satisfy this criterion. To minimise the num-
ber of series lost, I use exporter-reported data wherever the mirrored data is
insufficiently complete.7 Finally, in order to address potential concerns about
reverse causality, I exclude all exporting sectors whose average exports during
the sample period exceeded 1% of domestic GDP. The cleaned export data
comprises 28 industries for 100 countries, 38 of which experienced at least one
sovereign default during the sample period.
As in Rajan and Zingales (1998), financial dependence of sector-i produc-
tion is defined as the share of capital expenditure not financed from cash flows
by the median US firm in that sector, according to Compustat. The measure is
based on U.S. firm-level data for two reasons. Firstly, similarly detailed finan-
cial data at the firm level is not available for the majority of countries in the
sample used here, most notably the set of developing economies. Secondly,
even if such data were available, the observed use of finance would reflect
an equilibrium market outcome which, to the extent that financial-market
7None of the paper’s main results are sensitive to using only mirrored, or only exporter-
reported trade flows.
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 Median 
 Defaulter Non-Defaulter 
 
DCc2007/GDPc2007 
 
0.29 0.84 
 
Avg. Financial Dependence of Expc2007 
 
0.22 0.28 
 
Avg. CAct/GDPct in 2 Years Prior to Default 
 
-0.08 - 
 
Table 1: Economic Characteristics of Sample Defaulters
frictions are pervasive, may reflect domestic market distortions, rather than the
true "technological" financial dependence of a sector. Seeing as U.S. financial
markets can be viewed as the most frictionless in the world, U.S. data on
the use of external financing is likely to provide the best indicator of the
technological external financing requirement of different sectors.8 Table A2
in the Appendix lists this measure of financial dependence for my 28 ISIC
industries. The source is Braun (2003).
The default dummy is based on the initial year of any government default
on private bank or bond debt, reconciling information from Standard & Poor’s
(2003), Moody’s (2011) and the financial crisis database of Laeven and Valen-
cia (2008). This yields 61 distinct episodes of sovereign debt repudiation across
38 countries. Table A1 in the Appendix provides a comprehensive list of all
sample countries, and their sovereign debt crises as covered by my data.
The main additional control variables are country GDP and private-sector
domestic credit. Both are taken from the World Development Indicators in
current U.S. dollars, and converted into constant 2000 U.S. dollars.
3.1.3 Economic Characteristics of Sample Defaulters
If default by country c in year t leads to a temporary rise in the interest rate
charged on foreign loans to c, the discussion in Section 2 suggests that we
should observe a decline in the relative competitiveness of c’s exporters in in-
ternational goods markets in accordance with their degree of dependence on
external financing. A key identifying assumption, set out in equation (7), is
that default-prone economies rely on the international capital market to fin-
ance some of their inputs and, hence, that the foreign interest rate directly
affects exporters’ production costs. Table 2 documents that this is an appro-
priate description of the median defaulter covered in my sample.
The table compares two characteristics of interest, the ratio of private-
sector domestic credit to GDP and the average financial dependence of exports,
8For a more detailed discussion, see Rajan and Zingales (1998).
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for countries which did experience at least one default in my sample with those
which did not. It highlights that in 2007 the median defaulter’s ratio of do-
mestic private credit to GDP− a widely used measure of financial development
− was less than half that of the median non-defaulter. This reflects the fact
that foreign-debt defaults have predominantly occurred in countries with less
developed domestic financial markets, and may imply significant benefits for
their exporters from borrowing internationally. In a similar vein, it is note-
worthy that the most countries experienced net capital inflows on a large scale
Dep. Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
lnExpcit     
     
     
Defaultct   -0.109**  
 
 
  (0.044)  
Defaultct-1   -0.115**  
 
 
  (0.050)  
Defaultct-2   -0.061  
 
 
  (0.047)  
FinDepi!Defaultct    -0.460*** 
 
 
   (0.136) 
FinDepi!Defaultct-1    -0.398** 
 
 
   (0.156) 
FinDepi!Defaultct-2    -0.147 
 
 
   (0.147) 
lnGDPct 0.513*** 0.094 0.074  
 
 
(0.033) (0.061) (0.062)  
lnDCct 0.672*** 0.100*** 0.097***  
 
 
(0.027) (0.032) (0.033)  
FinDepi* lnDCct    -0.027*** 
 
 
   (0.010) 
Country F.E. No Yes No No 
Industry F.E. Yes No No No 
Year F.E. Yes No Yes No 
Country-Year F.E. No No No Yes 
Industry-Year F.E. No Yes No Yes 
Country-Indust. F.E. No No Yes No 
Group-Indust. F.E. No No No Yes 
     
     
Observations 51,729 51,729 51,729 51,729 
Adj. R2 0.78 0.84 0.93 0.86 
 
The dependent variable is the log of exports to the world by 3-digit ISIC industries, 1980-2007. 
Standard errors are clustered at the country-year level. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
Table 2: Baseline Regression Results
12
prior to debt crises, with the current account deficit in the two years prior to
the median default episode amounting to 8% of the country’s GDP.
The table also shows that the average financial dependence of exports is
somewhat lower in defaulter economies. This is no surprise because, to the
extent that sovereign default is correlated with weak financial and legal insti-
tutions, domestic producers would be expected to specialise in goods that are
less reliant on both.9
3.2 Empirical Results
3.2.1 Baseline Specification
The results of the baseline regression are reported in Table 2. Column 4
lists the results from the full specification as set out in equation (11), while
columns 1 to 3 detail the outcome of three regressions with a reduced number
of explanatory variables.
Column 1 shows that sectoral exports are strongly positively correlated
with GDP and domestic credit, after controlling for cross-industry and -year
variation using industry and year fixed effects. However, the importance of
both variables is drastically diminished once country- and industry-year fixed
effects are introduced (Column 2), with only domestic credit retaining a sig-
nificant positive coefficient, indicating a 0.1% increase in exports for a 1%
increase in domestic credit.
Column 3 introduces the default dummy with two lags, as well as country-
industry fixed effects. Introducing country-industry dummies boosts the re-
gression’s adjusted R2 to .93 as, predictably, the variation in sectoral exports
across countries is substantially larger than the variation of countries’ ex-
ports within industries over time. The new set of fixed effects alters the
coefficient estimates of GDP and domestic credit little. Meanwhile, the coef-
ficient estimates for the default dummies suggest that debt crises are asso-
ciated with a contemporaneous decline in exports of 11% and a decline of
12% in the subsequent year, both of which are statistically significant at
the 5% level. There is little evidence of an impact on exports in the third
year, but the hypothesis that the three coefficients are jointly insignificant
can be rejected at the 5% level of statistical significance. Overall, this find-
ing is suggestive of a decline in manufacturing exports as a result of de-
fault but, owing to the omitted variable problem discussed in Section 3.1.1
as well as the possibility of reverse causality from exports to the likelihood of
9See Beck (2003) and Nunn (2007) for two papers which test this hypothesis formally,
and find it to be supported by the data.
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Dep. Variable: (1) (2) (3) 
lnExpcit    
    
    
FinDepi!Defaultct -0.464*** -0.441*** -0.445*** 
 
 
(0.137) (0.137) (0.138) 
FinDepi!Defaultct-1 -0.395** -0.384** -0.384** 
 
 
(0.156) (0.156) (0.156) 
FinDepi!Defaultct-2 -0.150 -0.139 -0.144 
 
 
(0.147) (0.147) (0.147) 
FinDepi!Bankct 0.038  0.049 
 
 
(0.116)  (0.116) 
FinDepi!Bankct-1 -0.032  -0.003 
 
 
(0.125)  (0.127) 
FinDepi!Bankct-2 0.048  0.079 
 
 
(0.130)  (0.134) 
FinDepi!Currct  -0.138 -0.143 
 
 
 (0.119) (0.121) 
FinDepi!Currct-1  -0.101 -0.110 
 
 
 (0.119) (0.120) 
FinDepi!Currct-2  -0.089 -0.095 
 
 
 (0.114) (0.114) 
Controls: Country-Year, Industry-Year and Group-Industry F.E., FinDepi* lnDCct, 
    
    
Observations 51,729 51,729 51,729 
Adj. R2 0.86 0.86 0.86 
 
The dependent variable is the log of exports to the world by 3-digit ISIC industries, 1980-2007. 
All regressions include country-year, industry-year and country group-industry fixed effects, and 
control for the impact of domestic credit conditions on financially dependent sectors. Standard 
errors are clustered at the country-year level. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
Table 3: Baseline Regression Results, Controlling for Financial Crises
debt crises, it is insufficient evidence to establish a causal link from default to
declines in exports.
To address these concerns, and to test a specific causal mechanism by which
a debt crisis may affect the defaulting economies’ exports, I estimate equation
(11) in Column 4 using country-time and industry-time fixed effects. I also
group countries by income and include group-specific industry dummies to al-
low for differences in specialisation between high- and low-income countries.10
10Income groups are based on the World Bank’s classification of countries into low in-
come, lower-middle income, upper-middle income, non-OECD high-income and OECD high
income.
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The estimated coefficients of the interaction between default and sectoral fin-
ancial dependence are negative, large and jointly significant at the 1% level.
This confirms the hypothesis developed in the previous sections and represents
the main finding of the paper: there is robust evidence that sovereign default
reduces the exports of highly financially dependent sectors relative to those
which are less financially vulnerable, consistent with a contraction in the sup-
ply of credit to exporters. In terms of magnitudes, the coefficient estimates
imply that default should cause the exports in the “Textiles” industry − which
is at the 75th percentile of industries ranked by their financial dependence − to
contract 11 percentage points more (or the expand 11 percentage points less)
than “Other non-metallic mineral products” − which is at the 25th percentile.
My regression also finds that higher volumes of domestic credit are as-
sociated with a relative contraction of the exports of financially dependent
Dep. Variable: (1) (2) (3) 
lnExpcit    
    
    
FinDepi!Defaultct+1 -0.026  -0.024 
 
 
(0.153)  (0.154) 
FinDepi!Defaultct -0.446*** -0.430*** -0.431*** 
 
 
(0.138) (0.139) (0.139) 
FinDepi!Defaultct-1 -0.383** -0.367** -0.366** 
 
 
(0.157) (0.158) (0.159) 
FinDepi!Defaultct-2 -0.141 -0.142 -0.139 
 
 
(0.148) (0.148) (0.149) 
FinDepi!Defaultct-3  -0.197 -0.197 
 
 
 (0.143) (0.143) 
FinDepi!Defaultct-4  -0.195 -0.195 
 
 
 (0.156) (0.156) 
Controls: 
Country-Year, Industry-Year and Group-Industry F.E., 
FinDepi!Bankct, FinDepi!Bankct-1, FinDepi!Bankct-2, 
FinDepi!Currct, FinDepi!Currct-1, FinDepi!Currct-2, 
FinDepi* lnDCct 
    
    
Observations 51,729 51,729 51,729 
Adj. R2 0.86 0.86 0.86 
 
The dependent variable is the log of exports to the world by 3-digit ISIC industries, 1980-2007. 
All regressions include country-year, industry-year and country group-industry fixed effects, and 
control for the impact of domestic credit conditions, banking crises and currency crises on 
financially dependent sectors. Standard errors are clustered at the country-year level. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
Table 4: Additional Lead and Lags of Default
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industries but the effect is not robust and small, with a 1% increase in do-
mestic credit causing “Textiles” to contract by a mere .01 percentage points
less than “Other non-metallic mineral products”. This provides an intriguing
contrast with Rajan and Zingales (1998). Their paper shows that deep do-
mestic financial markets benefit the overall growth of industries which are
very financially dependent. Yet my findings indicate that domestic financial
development, represented by the domestic supply of credit, has only a minor
impact on the exports of financially dependent sectors. This lends support
to the view that domestic exporters are more reliant on international than on
domestic capital markets, and is in line with the findings of Manova (2008)
who shows that improved access to foreign credit strongly benefits financially
dependent exporters.
A possible objection to the specification in Column 4 of Table 2 is that
default may coincide with domestic bank or currency crises, and that the
coefficients of interest may capture the impact of these financial crises, rather
than a default-specific effect. Banking and currency crises are considerably
more frequent in my sample than sovereign debt crises, with a total of 71
episodes of banking sector distress and 90 currency crises covered.11 Yet only
10 out of 61 sample defaults coincide with a banking or currency crisis in the
same year. This makes it implausible a priori that my key coefficients capture
the omitted effect of the latter episodes.
In Table 3, I control for the effect of banking and currency distress directly.
The size and statistical significance of the coefficients of interest is virtually
unchanged. Meanwhile, currency crises appear to have a similar effect on
sectoral exports as sovereign default, albeit smaller and not statistically sig-
nificant. By contrast, there is little evidence that banking crises impact on
domestic exports through a financial-dependence channel, which underscores
the potential importance of foreign credit relative to domestic financial condi-
tions for exporters in crisis-prone economies.
This section has documented that, for the period 1980-2007, the empir-
ical specification derived in Sections 2 lends strong support to the hypothesis
default hurt domestic exporters via a reduction in the supply of credit. Be-
low, I explore the robustness of this finding. Unless otherwise indicated, each
subsequent regression uses country-year, industry-year and country group-
industry fixed effects and controls for the impact of banking and currency
crises as well as domestic credit conditions.
11The dates of banking and currency crises are based on Laeven and Valencia (2008) and
reported in Table A2 of the Appendix.
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3.2.2 Robustness Checks
So far, I have arbitrarily estimated a model with two lags of the default dummy,
implying that the average effect of default on sectoral exports persists for a
total of three years. In principle, however, there is no reason why the effect
should not be more persistent. Table 4 presents the estimation results when
two additional lags (as well as a lead) of the default dummy is included in the
estimation.
Dep. Variable: (1) (2) (3) 
lnExpcit t ! 1994 Excluding serial defaulters Excluding 2 most and least financially dependent industries 
    
    
FinDepi!Defaultct -0.454* -0.502** -0.456* 
 
 
(0.235) (0.251) (0.265) 
FinDepi!Defaultct-1 -0.420 -0.182 -0.253 
 
 
(0.270) (0.265) (0.302) 
FinDepi!Defaultct-2 -0.258 -0.094 -0.045 
 
 
(0.231) (0.286) (0.314) 
FinDepi!Bankct -0.043 0.106 0.392 
 
 
(0.173) (0.131) (0.304) 
FinDepi!Bankct-1 -0.094 0.011 0.058 
 
 
(0.174) (0.145) (0.303) 
FinDepi!Bankct-2 -0.048 0.056 0.297 
 
 
(0.172) (0.154) (0.324) 
FinDepi!Currct 0.127 0.015 0.120 
 
 
(0.179) (0.150) (0.294) 
FinDepi!Currct-1 0.166 0.001 -0.026 
 
 
(0.157) (0.138) (0.274) 
FinDepi!Currct-2 0.171 0.006 0.209 
 
 
(0.134) (0.133) (0.268) 
FinDepi* lnDCct -0.029** -0.036*** 0.134*** 
 
 
(0.013) (0.011) (0.024) 
Controls: Country-Year, Industry-Year and Group-Industry F.E. 
    
    
Observations 30,152 42,411 40,357 
Adj. R2 0.87 0.88 0.87 
 
The dependent variable is the log of exports to the world by 3-digit ISIC industries, 1980-2007. 
All regressions include country-year, industry-year and country group-industry fixed effects, and 
control for the impact of domestic credit conditions, banking crises and currency crises on 
financially dependent sectors. Standard errors are clustered at the country-year level. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
Table 5: Sample Restrictions
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Column 1 shows that the coefficient on the lead of default is small and
not statistically significant at any reasonable level. This is reassuring as it
indicates that there is no robust change in sectoral export patterns prior to the
default event, supporting the hypothesis of a causal relationship proposed here.
Two additional lags of default return negative but statistically insignificant
coefficients, irrespective of whether the lead is included or not (Columns 2 and
3). Throughout, the baseline coefficients and standard errors remain unaltered.
This evidence seems to imply that the change in sectoral export patterns
commences in the year of default and fades over time.
Dep. Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
lnExpcit      
      
      
FinDepi!Defaultct -0.445***  -0.446***  -0.432*** 
 
 
(0.138)  (0.139)  (0.135) 
FinDepi!Defaultct-1 -0.384**  -0.411***  -0.430*** 
 
 
(0.156)  (0.148)  (0.151) 
FinDepi!Defaultct-2 -0.144  -0.181  -0.188 
 
 
(0.147)  (0.141)  (0.138) 
Tangi!Defaultct  0.160 0.158   
 
 
 (0.474) (0.473)   
Tangi!Defaultct-1  0.557 0.635   
 
 
 (0.423) (0.410)   
Tangi!Defaultct-2  0.412 0.473   
 
 
 (0.390) (0.382)   
ImPenci!Defaultct    -0.793 -0.424 
 
 
   (0.784) (0.769) 
ImPenci !Defaultct-1    0.783 1.268 
 
 
   (0.820) (0.786) 
ImPenci !Defaultct-2    0.783 1.000 
 
 
   (0.865) (0.823) 
ImPenci    -0.430* -0.451* 
 
 
   (0.248) (0.248) 
Controls: 
Country-Year, Industry-Year and Group-Industry F.E., 
FinDepi!Bankct, FinDepi!Bankct-1, FinDepi!Bankct-2, 
FinDepi!Currct, FinDepi!Currct-1, FinDepi!Currct-2, FinDepi* lnDCct 
      
      
Observations 51,729 51,729 51,729 51,690 51,690 
Adj. R2 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 
 
The dependent variable is the log of exports to the world by 3-digit ISIC industries, 1980-2007. 
All regressions include country-year, industry-year and country group-industry fixed effects, and 
control for the impact of domestic credit conditions, banking crises and currency crises on 
financially dependent sectors. Standard errors are clustered at the country-year level. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
Table 6: Alternative Industry Characteristics
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With no more than two relevant lags of default, my model seems to find
a less persistent impact of default on trading patterns than previous studies.
Rose’s (2005) baseline specification contains 15 lags of default, and Martinez
and Sandleris (2008) choose 5 lags in their most preferred specification. Both
admit, however, that problems of multicolinearity make the appropriate lag
structure difficult to determine.12 Moreover, a three-year duration of the ef-
fect of default on sectoral export patterns would be broadly consistent with
the observation by Gelos et al. (2003) that the average period of capital-
market exclusion suffered by defaulters between 1980 and 1999 was 4.5 years.
This would in turn support the notion that capital-market access is crucial in
explaining the link between sovereign default and trading patterns.
Table 5 explores the effect of several sample restrictions. The estimated
impact of sovereign default on sectoral export patterns is, if anything, stronger
if the estimation is restricted to the second half of the sample period (Column
1), and the three coefficients of interest remain jointly significant at the 1%
level. A similar picture emerges if countries which defaulted more than once
between 1980 and 2007 are excluded (Column 2). Excluding the three most
financially dependent industries − “Plastic products”, “Professional and sci-
entific equipment” and “Electric machinery” − and the three least financially
dependent industries − ”Tobacco”, “Pottery” and “Leather products” − deliv-
ers coefficient estimates which are similar in magnitude to the baseline, but
with larger standard errors.
In Table 6, I allow for default to affect sectoral exports in accordance
with two other industry characteristics, the industry’s asset tangibility and its
import penetration. Asset tangibility of industry i is defined as the share of
net plant, property, and equipment in total assets for the median U.S. firm in i.
This measure is used in the literature to capture an industry’s ability to muster
collateral and its source is Braun (2003), who shows it to be uncorrelated with
the Rajan-Zingales measure of financial dependence. Import penetration is a
country-industry-specific indicator based on a sector’s average share in total
imports. It is defined as ImpPenct = 1T
∑
t (Impcit/
∑
i Impcit), where Impcit
is the nominal value of imports by country c in industry i and year t.
Columns 1 to 5 of Table 6 show that the additional interactions do not alter
the baseline result. There is evidence of a shift in exports towards sectors with
12Note that Rose (2005) and Martinez and Sandleris (2008) use renegotiations of publicly
held debt through the Paris Club to construct their default dummy, while I use records of
defaults on private bank and bond debt. The Paris Club data is useful to the particular
question these studies attempt to address, but Paris Club renegotiations are more frequent
than the repudiation of privately held debt – giving rise to multicolinearity problems in
lagged models – and arguably less representative of the non-cooperative nature of default
commonly alleged in the theoretical literature.
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Dep. Variable: (1) (2) (3) 
lnExpcit    
    
    
FinDepi!Defaultct -0.451***  -0.458*** 
(CA reversal) 
 
(0.163)  (0.163) 
FinDepi!Defaultct-1 -0.399**  -0.407** 
(CA reversal) 
 
(0.183)  (0.183) 
FinDepi!Defaultct-2 -0.255*  -0.251 
(CA reversal) 
 
(0.154)  (0.155) 
FinDepi!Defaultct  -0.398 -0.418* 
(no CA reversal) 
 
 (0.244) (0.250) 
FinDepi!Defaultct-1  -0.275 -0.313 
(no CA reversal) 
 
 (0.283) (0.286) 
FinDepi!Defaultct-2  0.207 0.176 
(no CA reversal) 
 
 (0.336) (0.337) 
Controls: 
Country-Year, Industry-Year and Group-Industry F.E., 
FinDepi!Bankct, FinDepi!Bankct-1, FinDepi!Bankct-2, 
FinDepi!Currct, FinDepi!Currct-1, FinDepi!Currct-2, 
FinDepi* lnDCct 
    
    
Observations 51,729 51,729 51,729 
Adj. R2 0.86 0.86 0.86 
 
The dependent variable is the log of exports to the world by 3-digit ISIC industries, 1980-2007. 
All regressions include country-year, industry-year and country group-industry fixed effects, and 
control for the impact of domestic credit conditions, banking crises and currency crises on 
financially dependent sectors. Standard errors are clustered at the country-year level. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
Table 7: Current Account Reversals
a large share of collateralisable assets in the years following default, but none
of the coefficients on the relevant interaction terms are statistically significant.
By contrast, there is no clear indication that the degree of a sector’s importer
penetration affects its response to a sovereign debt crisis in either direction.
Finally, I assess whether the differential impact of sovereign default across
sectors coincides with a change in the defaulting country’s pattern of foreign
borrowing. If default is associated with a loss of access to foreign credit mar-
kets which hurts financially dependent exporters, the latter effect should be
stronger the larger the reversal in foreign borrowing. Section 3.1.2 observes
that most defaulters were net recipients of foreign capital flows in the two years
prior to default. Comparing countries’ average current account balance in the
two years before and after default episodes, I find that two thirds of these
episodes were associated with an improvement in the current account (i.e. a
decline in net foreign borrowing). I group default episodes into two categories,
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depending on whether they coincided with a current account reversal or not.
I then construct separate default dummies for each category.
Table 7 presents the results of my estimations when default is grouped
according to whether or not a current account reversal took place. The table
documents that both categories are associated with a decline in the exports
of financially dependent sectors relative to less financially vulnerable counter-
parts, but the effect is only statistically significant − and considerably stronger
− for default episodes associated with current account reversals. Of course,
this finding does not imply a causal link between default and current account
reversals, but it provides further evidence that access to international capital
markets plays a crucial role for explaining changes in the patterns of trade in
the wake of sovereign debt crises.
3.3 Financial Dependence and the Decline in Exports
3.3.1 Magnitude of the Financial-Dependence Channel
Following on from equation (10), the impact of sovereign default at t on exports
in sector i is 4Expcit
Expcit
∣∣∣∣
4Defaultct=1
= β1FinDepi + β2, (12)
where I drop the lag-related subscripts for expositional convenience. Equation
(12) implies
4Expct
Expct
∣∣∣∣
4Defaultct=1
= β1
∑
i FinDepiExpcit∑
iExpcit
+ β2, (13)
where
∑
i FinDepiExpcit/
∑
iExpcit is the average financial dependence of
exports in country c and year t. Equation (13) describes the overall impact
of sovereign default on a country’s manufacturing exports, which consists of
the financial-dependence-related impact (β1) and a possible direct effect (β2).
My estimates from Section 3.2 only allow me to identify the importance of
the financial-dependence channel, which is conditional on a country’s export
composition at the time of default. Figure 2 plots the the impact from this
channel for the 61 default episodes in my sample.13
The figure documents that, by itself, the financial-dependence channel em-
phasised in this paper implied a reduction in countries’ overall exports follow-
ing almost all of the 61 defaults. The median and mean of the distribution are
13One way to think about Figure 2 is as a plot of the distribution of (13) for the 61
debt crises assuming β2 = 0. To construct the figure, I use the average financial de-
pendence of exports for each defaulter in the three years prior to the debt crisis, and let
βˆ1 = 13
(
βˆ10 + βˆ11 + βˆ12
)
≈ −.324 from my baseline regression.
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Figure 2: Distribution of β1 ×
∑
i FinDepiExpcit/
∑
iExpcit for Sample Defaults
very close, at -7.0% and -6.9% respectively. This number is clearly economic-
ally significant. Nevertheless, it would be desirable to ascertain for how much
of the overall change in manufacturing exports in the wake of the average
default this channel can account. To answer this question, the next section
considers alternative estimates of the overall impact of default on exports.
3.3.2 Overall Impact of Default on Exports
As discussed in Section 3.1.1, the overall impact of default on sectoral exports
is difficult to estimate consistently. Column 1 of Table 8 provides the results
from a panel regression, using my full sample and year and country-industry
fixed effects, where the effect of crises − and specifically, default − is captured
by dummies taking value 1 in the first year of the episode and the two sub-
sequent years. This is akin to the regression estimated in Column 3 of Table
2. If equation (12) describes the true effect of default on sectoral exports,
the estimated coefficient in Table 8 captures both the direct effect of default
(β2) and the financial-dependence-related impact (β1) conditional on the aver-
age defaulter’s export composition. The estimate suggests that the combined
effect amounts to an average decline in exports of 11% for three years.
Arguably, the results reported in Column 1 of Table 8 may overstate the
overall impact of default on exports because the regression misses crucial
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Dep. Variable: (1) (2) 
lnExpcit Full Panel PSM Diff.-in-Diff. 
   
   
Postt  0.452*** 
 
 
 (0.063) 
Defaultct -0.109*** -0.155* 
 
 
(0.041) (0.094) 
Bankct -0.034 -0.198** 
 
 
(0.023) (0.097) 
Currct 0.008 -0.165* 
 
 
(0.023) (0.085) 
lnGDPct 0.073 0.009 
 
 
(0.064) (0.276) 
lnDCct 0.098*** -0.066 
 
 
(0.033) (0.130) 
Year F.E. Yes No 
Country-Indust. F.E. Yes Yes 
   
   
Observations 51,729 2,844 
Adj. R2 0.93 0.92 
 
The dependent variable in regression (1) is the log of exports to the world by 3-digit ISIC 
industries, 1980-2007. The crisis dummies in regression (1) take value 1 in the first three years 
after a default, bank or currency crisis. The dependent variable in regression (2) is the log of 
average industry exports in the three years before and after a default episode. Both regressions 
include country-industry fixed effects, and control for GDP and domestic credit conditions. 
Standard errors are clustered at the country-year level. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
Table 8: Overall Impact of Default on Exports
country-time varying explanatory variables, or because the true causality may
be reversed with default triggered by the incipient decline in exports. To tackle
this issue, I derive an alternative estimate of the overall impact of default on
sectoral exports using a propensity score matching (PSM) approach.14 This
approach is also used in Levchenko, Rancière and Thoenig (2009) to identify
the impact of financial liberalisation on sectoral output growth. Its basic
premise is the identification of an appropriate control group to estimate a
classic difference-in-difference model: for each country c experiencing default
in year t, a control country is identified which displayed a similar propensity
to default at t but did not experience default. If the match between treatment
14The use of instruments in the present context faces the insurmountable challenge of
identifying a variable which is highly correlated with a country’s propensity to default on
foreign debt, but uncorrelated with the volume of its exports.
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and control countries is appropriate, the PSMmethodology simulates a random
experiment.15
To determine a country’s propensity to default in year t, I estimate a logistic
regression of the form
Defaultct = α0 + α1DefaultExpectationct + α24 lnGDPct + εct, (14)
where Defaultct takes value 1 if default occurred in c at t and 0 otherwise,
DefaultExpectationct is a measure of a country’s perceived default probab-
ility, and 4 lnGDPct captures contemporaneous deteriorations in economic
conditions. DefaultExpectationct is measured using historical “foreign debt
risk” scores from the Political Risk Services Group, while 4 lnGDPct is based
on GDP data from the World Development Indicators.16 The specification is
designed to match countries based on expectations of debt distress ahead of
the default date as well as short-term economic changes likely to trigger de-
fault. It passes the Dehejia and Wahba (2002) test of equality of means within
strata − a key criterion for the PSM approach to be applicable in this context.
Using the propensity scores predicted by the logit model, I calculate the
proximity between countries c and d based on their default propensity as
Proximitycd =
1
3
tc∑
t=tc−2
(psct − psdt)2 ,
where tc is the year in which c defaulted and psct is c’s propensity score at t.
I use the first neighbour matching method and define the appropriate control
country for defaulter c as
CCc = arg min
d∈C,|tc−td|≥3
Proximitycd,
where the restriction |tc − td| ≥ 3 is imposed to prevent countries which defaul-
ted at nearby dates from being chosen as control. Table A3 in the Appendix
lists the control countries for each default episode.
Having chosen control countries, I estimate the following difference-in-
difference specification:
lnExpcit = θ0Postt + θ1Defaultct + δci + γZcit + εcit,
15My PSM approach in this section closely follows Levchenko, Rancière ad Thoenig (2009).
The interested reader is referred to their paper for a more detailed discussion of the PSM
methodology.
16As the “foreign debt risk” scores have only been calculated since 1985, I am forced to
restrict my PSM analysis to default episodes which occurred after this date.
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where lnExpcit represents the log of countries’ average exports in the three
years before and after the default episode, Postt is a dummy taking value 0
before the episode and 1 after, and Defaultct is a binary indicator taking value
1 if a country experienced a debt crisis. As before Zcit is a vector of control
variables and δci a set of country-industry fixed effects. The results from the
OLS regression are reported in Column 2 of Table 8.
The PSM regression finds a 16% average decline in manufacturing sector
exports as a result of sovereign default − somewhat larger than the magnitude
of the decline estimated in the panel regression. The coefficient estimate is
significant at the 10% level of statistical significance. It indicates that, if
anything, the panel regression may understate the overall reduction in exports
due to default.
Table 9 compares these findings with the impact of sovereign default on
trade flows estimated in earlier studies. Rose (2005) and Martinez and Sand-
leris (2008) identify the impact of default on international trading patterns
by analysing bilateral trade flows in the aftermath of sovereign debt rene-
gotiations. The table displays results from their most comparable reported
specifications, using a default dummy with four lags. It highlights that my es-
timates are in the same ball park as theirs, despite methodological differences,
with the estimated overall decline in exports due to default ranging from 6
to 16%. This implies that, if we accept the “true” overall decline in exports
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Source: Table 8 Table 8 Martinez and Sandleris (‘08) Rose (‘05) 
     
     
! 
"Expct
Expct
 due to default -0.11 -0.16 -0.06 -0.11 
     
Persistence 3 years 3 years 5 years 5 years 
     
     
Identification 
Annual panel of 
sector-level 
exports, with 
country-industry 
and year F.E. 
Diff.-in-diff. on 
sector-level 
exports, with 
control countries 
based on 
propensity score. 
Annual panel of 
bilateral trade 
flows, with country 
and year fixed 
effects. Default 
dummy captures 
the impact on trade 
will all partners. 
Annual panel of 
bilateral trade 
flows, with country 
and year fixed 
effects. Default 
dummy captures 
the impact on trade 
with defaulted 
creditors. 
     
 
Columns (3) and (4) report comparable regression results from the two respective papers. 
Persistence indicates the number of years default is assumed to affect trade flows in the given 
empirical specification, including the year in which default took place. 
Table 9: Overall Impact of Default on Exports, Comparison
25
caused by sovereign default to lie in this range, the financial-dependence chan-
nel uncovered in this paper can explain at least half of the impact of sovereign
default on trade. The “trade costs” of sovereign default identified by Rose
(2005) may thus be a mere symptom of capital-market exclusion triggered by
sovereign debt distress.
4 Summary and Conclusion
In this paper I demonstrate empirically that sovereign default leads to a decline
of the defaulting country’s exports in sectors with a high degree of financial
dependence relative to sectors which are less financially vulnerable. I argue
that this is due to a reduction in domestic exporters’ access to foreign capital.
Although the evidence for this claim is indirect, it is also compelling. The
estimated impact of default on sectoral exports occurs independently of the
depth of domestic credit markets or contemporaneous systemic crises among
resident banks. It is robust to changes in the sample composition, and to con-
trolling for a possible impact of default on sectoral exports through alternative
channels. It is also more pronounced for defaulters which experienced large
current account reversals.
My findings suggest that there exists a link between the sovereign’s abil-
ity to tap international capital markets in the aftermath of default and the
observed effect of sovereign debt crises on trade, widely interpreted as “trade
costs” of debt repudiation. Early proponents of such “trade costs” seem to
have been sympathetic to the view that these were credit-related. Bulow and
Rogoff (1989), for example, contend that if a country repudiates its foreign
loans it will “also be blocked from normal access to trade credits”. So far,
however, the present paper constitutes the only formal, broad-based empirical
investigation to provide evidence of a credit link between default and the pat-
terns of international trade. According to my estimates, this link can explain
most of the decline in trade triggered by sovereign debt crises.
From a theoretical vantage point, the observation that the “trade costs”
of default may constitute part of the overall costs of capital-market exclusion
has profound implications for our understanding of the factors which induce
governments to service their foreign debt. Much of the recent literature on sov-
ereign borrowing treats the threat of capital-market exclusion and the risk of
“trade costs” as substitutable explanations for why countries choose to honour
their obligations to foreign creditors. Based on the empirical analysis carried
out in this paper, this notion is is mistaken: if default does not reduce the de-
faulting country’s access to international lending, the “trade costs” of default
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may also fail to materialise. This implies that whenever circumstances render
capital-market exclusion unlikely − due to, say, coordination problems among
lenders −, we are bereft of an an alternative explanation of how sovereign
default might be deterred.
The question why countries repay their foreign debt is alive and well.
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Appendix
Country First Year of 
 Debt Crisis Bank Crisis Currency Crisis 
Albania 1991 1994 1997 
Argentina 1982, 1989, 2001 1980, 1989, 1995, 2001 1981, 1987, 2002 
Australia    
Austria    
Azerbaijan  1995 1994 
Bangladesh  1987  
Barbados    
Belarus  1995 1994, 1999 
Belize 2006   
Bolivia 1980, 1986, 1989 1986, 1994 1981 
Brazil 1983 1990, 1994 1987, 1992, 1999 
Cameroon  1987, 1995  
Chad  1992 1994 
Chile 1983   
China  1998  
Colombia  1982, 1998 1985 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  1983, 1991, 1994 1983, 1989, 1994, 1999 
Congo, Rep. 1983 1992 1994 
Costa Rica  1987, 1994 1991 
Côte d’Ivoire 1983, 2000   
Croatia 1992 1998  
Czech Republic  1996  
Denmark    
Djibouti  1991  
Dominica 2003   
Dominican Republic 1982, 2005 2003 1985, 1990, 2003 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1984  1990 
El Salvador  1989 1986 
Fiji    
Finland  1991 1993 
France    
Gabon 1999, 2002  1994 
Georgia   1992, 1999 
Germany    
Ghana 1987 1982 1983, 1993, 2000 
Greece   1983 
Grenada 2004   
Guatemala 1989   
Guinea 1986, 1991 1993 2005 
Haiti  1994 1992, 2003 
Honduras   2003 
Hong Kong, China    
Hungary  1991  
Iceland   1981, 1989 
India  1993  
Indonesia 1998, 2000, 2002 1997 1998 
Ireland    
Israel   1985 
Italy   1981 
Jamaica 1981, 1987 1996 1983, 1991 
Japan  1997  
Jordan 1989 1989 1989 
Kenya 1994 1985, 1992 1993 
Korea, Rep.  1997 1998 
Lebanon  1990 1990 
Madagascar 1981, 1986  1994, 2004 
Malawi 1988  1994 
Malaysia  1997 1998 
Mali  1987  
Mauritania 1992 1984 1993 
Mauritius    
Mexico  1994 1995 
Mongolia   1990, 1997 
Morocco 1983, 1986 1980 1981 
Mozambique 1983 1987 1987 
Nepal  1988 1984, 1992 
Netherlands    
New Zealand    
Nicaragua 2003 1990, 2000 1990 
Pakistan 1999   
Panama 1987 1988  
Papua New Guinea    
Paraguay 2003 1995 2002 
Peru 1980, 1983 1983 1981, 1988 
Philippines 1983 1983, 1997 1993, 1998 
Poland    
Portugal   1983 
Romania  1990 1996 
Rwanda   1991 
Senegal 1981, 1990, 1992  1994 
Sierra Leone 1983, 1986 1990 1983, 1989, 1998 
Singapore    
South Africa 1985, 1993  1984 
Spain   1983 
Sri Lanka  1989  
Suriname   1990, 1995, 2001 
Sweden  1991 1993 
Switzerland    
Syrian Arab Republic    
Thailand  1983, 1997 1998 
Togo 1988, 1991  1994 
Trinidad and Tobago 1988  1986 
Tunisia  1991  
Turkey  2000 1991, 1996, 2001 
United Kingdom  2007  
United States  1988, 2007  
Uruguay 1983, 1987, 1990, 2003 2002 1983, 1990, 2002 
Vietnam  1997  
Zimbabwe  1995 1991 
 
Table A1: Sample Countries and Financial Crises
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Industry 
ISIC Description FinDepi Tangi 
    
311 Food products  .1368  .3777 
313 Beverages  .0722  .2974 
314 Tobacco - .4512  .2208 
321 Textiles  .4005  .3730 
322 Wearing apparel, except footwear  .0286  .1317 
323 Leather products - .1400  .0960 
324 Footwear, except rubber or plastic - .0799  .1167 
331 Wood products, except furniture  .2840  .3796 
332 Furniture, except metal  .2357  .2630 
341 Paper and products  .1756  .5579 
342 Printing and publishing  .2038  .3007 
351 Industrial chemicals  .2050  .4116 
352 Other chemicals  .2178  .1973 
353 Petroleum refineries  .0420  .6708 
354 Miscellaneous petroleum and coal products  .3341  .3038 
355 Rubber products  .2265  .3790 
356 Plastic products  1.1401  .3448 
361 Pottery, china - .1459  .0745 
362 Glass and products  .5285  .3313 
369 Other non-metallic mineral products  .0620  .4200 
371 Iron and steel  .0871  .4581 
372 Non-ferrous metals  .0055  .3832 
381 Fabricated metal products  .2371  .2812 
382 Machinery, except electrical  .4453  .1825 
383 Machinery, electric  .7675  .2133 
384 Transport equipment  .3069  .2548 
385 Professional and scientific equipment  .9610  .1511 
390 Other manufactured products  .4702  .1882 
 
Table A2: Sample Industries and Industry Characteristics
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Default Episode Control Country 
Albania 1991 Romania 
Argentina 1989 Kenya 
Argentina 2001 Philippines 
Bolivia 1986 Peru 
Bolivia 1989 El Salvador 
Côte d’Ivoire 2000 Sierra Leone 
Gabon 1999 Sri Lanka 
Gabon 2002 Philippines 
Ghana 1987 Guinea 
Guatemala 1989 El Salvador 
Guinea 1991 Hungary 
Indonesia 1998 Syrian Arab Republic 
Indonesia 2000 Syrian Arab Republic 
Indonesia 2002 Turkey 
Jamaica 1987 Paraguay 
Jordan 1989 Kenya 
Kenya 1994 Syrian Arab Republic 
Madagascar 1986 Chile 
Malawi 1988 Mali 
Morocco 1986 Israel 
Nicaragua 2003 Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Pakistan 1999 Senegal 
Panama 1987 Costa Rica 
Paraguay 2003 Egypt, Arab Rep. 
Senegal 1990 Greece 
Senegal 1992 Greece 
Sierra Leone 1986 Peru 
South Africa 1993 Philippines 
Togo 1988 Kenya 
Togo 1991 Hungary 
Trinidad and Tobago 1998 Mali 
Uruguay 1987 Mongolia 
Uruguay 1990 Mexico 
Uruguay 2003 Zimbabwe 
 
Table A3: Default Episodes and PS-Matched Control Countries
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